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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to § 78 2a3(2)(h), Utah Code.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
i

Xopellee is dissatisfied with the plethora of "Issues Presented for Review"

found in Appellant's Brief as they obscure the two central issues in this case, whu . ire:
Do the provisions oi \ •>-1>- ._,o.. < .. . •
efteCw'. •. .
re

•

;.-

;..

4.

..?
^arues, wmch

:* pcrty and child support issues, to just three years, or

do the terms oi such of an agreement continue until one party establishes
a substantial change in circumstances? This issue was placed preserved in
the tiidi ajiu' . * .; v..
[I-

.

r

K, I II! |

Was the trial court correct in determining there was not a substantial change
in circumstances upon which to justify a modification of existing child
support? T his issue was preserved in the trial i1 mi i 11 !n »ili Mi I )ienn [R.
I! ,uiil -li, I

| iinl I - TilLmy |K \\ "\ I1 ! ] .

1

At the time Mr. Diener filed his original Petition to Modify, this provision was found
in subsection (6) of the cited statute. It was subsequently renumbered to subsection (8).
These provisions appear to be identical, so the current version is cited.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES A N D RULES
§ 78-45-7.2(8), Utah Code. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(a)
If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the
previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition the
court to adjust the amount of a child support order.
(b)
Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall,
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether there
is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that would be
required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or more and
the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the
amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(c)
A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary
for an adjustment under Subsection (8)(b).
§30-3-5(1) and (3) Utah Code.

Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Division of debts —
Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody
and parent-time — Determination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

(1)
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a)
an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children;
(b)
if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost,
an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the
dependent children;
(c)
pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i)
an order specifying which party is
responsible for the payment of joint debts,

2

obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these
orders; and
(d)
provisions for income withholding in accordance with
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
*

*

*

(3)
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations
for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tiffany Jacobs meet Erich Diener in high school. Tiffany's parents were deceased,
having been murdered when she was 7 years old. [R.220, p. 54]. At the time she met Mr.
Diener, Tiffany was the beneficiary of a trust account left from her parents' estate that
exceeded $100,000. [Id., p. 57]. She also had a life insurance policy that was purchased for
her after her parents died [Id., p. 36]. Mr. Diener and Tiffany evidently hit it off because
he too had lost a family member [Id, p. 55], so they both had common ground not shared
with others.
Mr. Diener became aware of Tiffany's assets and upon graduation asked Tiffany
to pay the $5,000 tuition for him to spend a semester at Harvard University [Id, pp. 55-
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56]. By this time, the parties had discussed marriage and Mr. Diener told Tiffany that he
considered this tuition a loan and in Tiffany's words, "it was an investment in him and
our future together" [Id, p. 56]. In addition, Tiffany purchased a vehicle for Erich, a
Toyota Land Cruiser. [Id., pp. 56-7] When it was sold, Mr. Diener repaid one-half of the
purchase price and, according to Tiffany, expressed remorse that "he couldn't pay me
back quite yet right now" [Id., p. 57]. Tiffany purchased a number of things for Erich's
benefit prior to the marriage because Mr. Diener often talked her into buying such things,
saying that he would pay Tiffany back later [Id., p. 58].
When Erich returned from Harvard, the parties lived together for a period of time
[Id, pp. 9-10). By the time the parties got married on July 2, 1994 [R. 27], Tiffany's trust
account was exhausted [R. 220, p. 57]. However, the cash value of Tiffany's life insurance
policy was depleted during the marriage [Id., p. 36]. At the time the parties were married,
Mr. Diener was in the U.S. Army [Id., p. 16]. The parties' child, Zoe, was born on
February 19, 1995 [Id, p. 10].
While Mr. Diener was still in the Army, stationed at Ft. Mead, Maryland, the
marriage appeared to be doomed and the parties began discussing the terms of a divorce
[Id, p. 58]. Mr. Diener reviewed the matter at least once with a Judge Advocate General
attorney at Ft. Mead, Maryland [Id, pp. 5, 16, 45]. As the parties addressed the terms of
a divorce, Tiffany expressed concern that her trust fund had been depleted and she should
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have much more to live on than the $400 in child support that Mr. Diener initially offered
[Id., pp. 58-59]. Tiffany discussed her potential alimony and property claims but was
persuaded by Mr. Diener not to pursue those claims in exchange for his payment of a
higher amount of child support [Id., p. 59]. Mr. Diener admitted that he discussed with
Tiffany the higher child support and his desire that Tiffany not pursue an alimony claim
before the divorce [Id., p. 37]. Mr. Diener knew at the time he agreed to pay $400 per
month that it was more than the Child Support Guidelines would have obligated him to
pay [Id., p. 38]. After the parties agreed to the terms, Tiffany moved back to Salt Lake
City and pursued the divorce action. [Id., p. 58].
Pursuant to their agreement, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby Mr.
Diener agreed to pay $400 a month child support [R. 12]. Tiffany's attorney noted on the
child support worksheet that this amount was greater than the guidelines called for and
was set pursuant to the "Agreement of the parties." [R. 17]. At the time of the divorce,
the Court found that Erich was earning $1,700 a month and Tiffany was earning a little
less than $12.00 a month [R. 28].
In June, 1998, two months after the divorce, Mr. Diener began working for
TEKsystems at $12.00 an hour, but his income steadily grew into a $55,000 annual salary
[R.220, p. 19]. During this time, Mr. Diener never told Tiffany about his income and that
he would pay additional child support [Id., p. 39]. When he lost his full-time job with
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TEKsystems in September 2001, he received one month severance pay of $4,500 [Id., p.
46]. Before he started his job with Tucci's restaurant in November, 2001, Mr. Diener
traveled to Korea for at least two weeks visiting friends. This trip was paid for by his then
current girlfriend. [A/., pp 39-41].
Shortly after Mr. Diener started working at Tucci's, he filed the present Petition
to Modify on December 4, 2001 [R.43], which was served on January 3, 2002. In the
petition, Mr. Diener alleged that he was a full-time student and that his current monthly
income was $1,560 a month, including tips [R.44]. Discovery was undertaken, which
closed on May 1,2002 [R. 85]. According to the facts presented to the trial court, as stated
in Mr. Diener's brief (Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-5, fl 10-12, 14), Mr. Diener admitted that
for a five month period between May and September of 2002, he worked for his old
employer, TEKsystems, earning approximately $730 per month [Id., p. 24]. During that
same period he earned between $200 to $300 per week at Tucci's [R. 220, p. 22], which
extrapolates to approximately $860 to $1,290 per month. Since 2001 Mr. Diener had
performed, and continues to perform, computer work for his attorney at $25 per hour,
for which he received a IRS Form 1099 (miscellaneous income statement) for 2002 in the
amount of $1,912.50 [Id, pp. 25-6]. This income averages approximately $160 a month.
Therefore, for that five-month period between May and September, 2002, during the
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pendency of his Petition to Modify following the close of discovery, Mr. Diener received
income of between $1,751 and $2,281 per month.
In September 2002 Mr. Diener then terminated his employment with Tucci's and
enlisted in the Utah National Guard, receiving $250 per month [R. 220, p. 22]. In
October, 2002 he terminated his employment with TEKsystems and in January, 2003
took a job with The Gateway Academy, receiving about $240 per week [Id., pp. 24, 26-7.
He continues as a full-time college student, now at the University of Utah [Id., p. 28]. This
income, together with the work he continues to do for his attorney, shows Mr. Diener
was earning about $1,450 a month at the time of trial.

FACTS SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULING NOT MARSHALED BY THE APPELLANT.
The following evidence is not cited by Mr. Diener in his Brief, but is evidence
which supports the trial court's decision.
1.

Following service of his petition, Mr. Diener has not made the $400 a month

child support payments, but has paid a lower amount based upon his admitted $1,750 a
month income potential [R. 220, p. 32].
2.

Mr. Deiner's assertion that he became aware "at some time during the entire

proceedings" (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, 12; see also R. 220, p. 38) that the $400 per month
child support amount he agreed to pay was greater than the guidelines is an incomplete
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statement.

Mr. Diener in fact admitted at trial that he knew before he signed the

stipulation and the divorce was entered that this amount was more than the guidelines
called for:
Q. Okay. Now you had discussed with Tiffany the
sum of $4 0 0 a month in child support back in November of
'97, correct?
A.
I assume that's
right.
*

*

*

Q.
Okay, at the time you signed it, were you
at that time aware that $400 was greater than the Child
Support Guidelines would have ordinarily obligated you to
pay?
A.
At some time during the entire proceedings I
know I must have become aware of the fact that it was more.
Q.
Okay.
A.
So, when I signed i t , probably
so.
[R. 220, pp. 37, 38, emphasis added].
3.

Through counsel, Mr. Diener stipulated prior to trial [R. 144] that the sum

of $1,750 per month was his income for purposes of calculating child support. During the
trial, his counsel stated:
We've stipulated only for the purpose of
calculating child support, that income can be
imputed to him at $1,750 a month . .
*

*

•

The child support amount shall be based on one
full-time job and that's why we are suggesting
that we could impute it at $10 per hour as if
he were working full-time for his current
position.

8

[R. 220, pp. 67, 68].2
4.

As stated above, the worksheet submitted to the trial court before the

divorce decree was entered showed that the $400 per month figure Mr. Diener agreed to
pay for child support was greater than the guidelines and was arrived at pursuant to the
"Agreement of the parties." [R. 17].
5.

While Mr. Diener was earning $55,000 per year (which is nearly 270% more

than his income at the time the divorce was entered) at TEKsystems, he never mentioned
this to Tiffany and offered to pay more support [R. 220, p. 39].

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND
§ 78-45-7.2(8), UTAH CODE, SHOULD NOT
APPLY TO THE PETITION TO MODIFY.
Because of Mr. Diener1 s promises made to Tiffany before and during the marriage
[see, e.g. R. 220, pp. 43, 56, 57]— that he would make it up to her— when the parties

2

Mr. Diener occasionally attempts to qualify the stipulation by saying it was offered
only if the trial court found that there was a substantial change of circumstances and if the
trial court would indeed modify the child support provisions, which the trial court did
not. Yet as shown above, there was ample evidence presented by Mr. Diener for the trial
court to impute that amount of income to him despite his qualification, which the trial
court noted it could do. [R. 220, p. 90]. The only time the stipulation came with
qualifications was when it became apparent to Mr. Diener that trying to be clever might
be more advantageous.
9

discussed divorce terms, Tiffany voiced her concerns about alimony, repayment of her
lost pre-marital assets, and child support with Mr. Diener. In order to avoid Tiffany's
claims for alimony and a property settlement, Mr. Diener agreed to pay a higher amount
of child support [R. 220, p. 37, 59]. In keeping with their agreement, the Petition for
Dissolution did not pursue these claims [R. 1-4] and the Stipulation signed by the parties
contained the $400 per month child support figure. [R. 10-16]. This evidence persuaded
the trial court that "the amount of child support was a bargained-for consideration in
which concessions were made." [R. 220, p. 94-5].
In his Petition to Modify, Mr. Diener alleged that he was earning $1,560 per month
and that there was a substantial change in circumstances [R. 44, 46]. However, his
position soon changed when it became obvious that his income had not changed enough
to prove a substantial change in circumstances. Thereafter, Mr. Diener adopted the
argument that the three-year review provisions now found in § 78-45-7.2(8), Utah Code,
should apply to his request, relieving him of any obligation to show a substantial change
in circumstances, because three years had passed since the initial divorce decree. However
the trial court found that the parties bargained for the higher child support amount in
exchange for Ms. Diener not pursuing alimony and property settlement claims [R. 203].
§ 78-45-7.2(8) does not attempt to limit equity and established case law regarding
bargained-for provisions in a divorce decree. There are a number of Utah cases that affirm
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such provisions. These cases require a showing of a substantial, or material, change in
circumstances to modify a bargained-for terms in a decree.
[W]hen a decree is based upon a property settlement
agreement forged by the parties and sanctioned by the court,
equity must take such agreement into consideration. Equity
is not available to reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the
bargain made.
Landv. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1980) (footnote citations omitted).
In a case with some parallels to Mr. Diener's argument here, the supreme court in
Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), quoted the Land opinion in rejecting an
attempt by a divorced father to modify a stipulated child support obligation that required
his payment of child support so long as the children resided with their mother and were
full time students. The father argued that § 15-2-1, which establishes the age of majority
at 18 but also conferred power on courts in divorce actions to award child support to age
21, mandated that his stipulated obligation should end upon the children reaching that
age—regardless of whom they lived with or if they were still enrolled in school. The court
held:
Defendant has failed to observe the distinction between those
cases involving the statutory power of the court in a divorce
proceeding to enter orders concerning support and those cases
in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their
property rights by agreement, the terms of which are
incorporated in a decree. The limitations on the power of the
court to order support do not limit the rights of the husband
11

and wife to contract with respect to the education of their
children as part of an agreement settling their property rights.
A husband who has undertaken an obligation in consideration
of the provisions of the property settlement agreement which
were for his benefit, cannot subsequently complain that the
court, in the absence of such agreement, would have been
without power to order him to do so.
627 P.2d, at 527.
In Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992), this Court quoted Land to uphold
a stipulated child support order to provide extra payments during college enrollment.
After noting "both parties made concessions in exchange for their respective benefits,"
this Court held that "it would be highly inequitable to permit Mr. Hill to retain the
benefits and be relieved of the obligations he assumed in his bargain to Mrs. Hill."
Also quoting Land, this Court in Thornbladv. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197, 1198-9
(Utah App. 1993), noted "the equitable nature of child support proceedings." 849 P.2d.,
at 1198. This Court also observed that "[b]oth parties undoubtedly made concessions for
their respective benefits." 849 P.2d, at 1199. However, due to a substantial change in the
parties financial circumstances the appeals court upheld the trial court's modification to
terminate child support early. 849 P.2d, at 1199-1200.
Like these reported cases, the parties in the present case entered into a binding
agreement that they initially honored; Mr. Diener agreed to pay a higher amount of child
support to be relieved of a fight over alimony and a return of Tiffany's premarital assets
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that he used before and during the marriage while promising to return it in some fashion.
In return, Tiffany agreed to forgo such claims and accept a higher amount of child
support. It would be highly inequitable, and inappropriate, for Mr. Diener to rely solely
on a new statute to retain the benefit of his bargain, i.e., not having to defend claims for
a return of Tiffany's pre-marital property, and avoid his concomitant obligation, i.e., to
pay a higher amount of child support.
As our supreme court has more recently held:
. . . the general principle derived from our case law is that
spouses or prospective spouses may make binding contracts
with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar
as the negotiations are conducted in good faith . . ., and do
not unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory
duties.
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, 994-5, 1 25. There is no indication that by
adopting § 78-45-7.2(8) the legislature intended to limit the trial court's "equitable"
powers, or a court's "continuing jurisdiction" to consider changes to child support that
may be "reasonable and necessary." § 30-3-5(1) and (3), Utah Code. "The modification of
divorce decrees is a matter of equity." Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 1299
(Utah 1981).
At the close of trial, the trial stated that the application of the automatic 3 year
evaluation period would not be in Zoe Diener's best interests [R. 220, p. 95; R], which is
fully consistent with equity and the provisions of § 7845-7.2(8). Consequently, the trial
13

court's conclusion that application of this statute would be inequitable under the
circumstances [R. 206] is not error.
II.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW A SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES BY WHICH MR. DIENER
CAN REDUCE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
By agreeing that his income may be imputed at a level slightly higher than it was
at the time of the decree,3 Mr. Diener has waived any claim that he has suffered a
substantial change in his own financial circumstances, which itself should put an end to
his appeal. The evidence presented to the trial court indeed established that Mr. Diener
had been earning, just a few months before the trial, between $50 and $581 more per
month than at the time of divorce. He argued at trial that his post-discovery, last-minute
job changes, despite his agreement to impute income at a higher amount than he earned
at the time of divorce, are a substantial change in circumstances that justifies a lowering
of his stipulated support obligation. However, the trial court had ample evidence to

3

Which was true for a 5 month period during the pendency of Mr. Diener's petition
before the district court.
14

impute income to Mr. Diener in excess of his income at the time of the divorce, see page
5, above.4
Mr. Diener also argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider Tiffany's
unemployed status as a full-time student as a substantial change in circumstances that
would justify a reduction in support. Apparently Mr. Diener believes for this reason
alone he should be entitled to a 40% reduction in his child support obligation. Petitioner
has been unable to locate any case law that suggests that where the non-custodial obligor
is earning or is capable of earning more than he made at the time of the divorce, he still
can reduce the child support base solely upon the negative change in circumstances of the
custodial obligee. But even such cases could be found, Mr. Diener's argument has a fatal

flaw.
In his closing argument, Mr. Diener's counsel indicated that Mr. Diener sought a
reduction from $400 per month to $239 per month for child support. The trial court
asked if "the 239 is based on imputing income to her as well?" Mr. Diener's counsel
responded "That's correct." [R. 220, p. 67]. The only evidence as to Tiffany's income was
her acknowledgment [R. 220, at p. 5-6] of the findings made by the court at the time the
divorce was entered [R. 28], that she made $1,192 per month as a nanny. Thus, assuming
4

Mr. Diener makes much of the fact that he was a full time student at the U of U at the
time of trial. However, he was a full-time student at the time his petition was filed, and
was able to earn more than his income at the time of divorce during the proceedings
before the trial court, so his student status —for all practical purposes— is irrelevant.
15

the court imputed income to both Mr. Diener (either by stipulation without the
convenient qualification Mr. Diener urges or by virtue of his admitted income history)
and to Tiffany, the trial court would have imputed at least $1,750 monthly income to Mr.
Diener pursuant to § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), Utah Code, and $1,192 to Tiffany pursuant to § 7845-7.5 (7) (b). Consequently, there would be absolutely NO change infinancialcircumstances
for either party] Mr. Diener thus puts the trial court in an impossible situation, asking it
to impute income that is virtually unchanged from the amounts earned at the time of
decree, and then claiming the trial court erred in failing to find a substantial change in
circumstances. Parties may not "take advantage of self-invited error." Curry v. Curry, 321
P.2d 939, 950 (Utah 1958).
Even if this Court were to consider the every-three-year-modification provision of
§ 78-45-7.2(8) as obviating the requirement that he prove a substantial change, Mr. Diener
will be hard-pressed to establish, pursuant to § 78-45-7.2(8)(b), that it would be in "the
best interests" of his minor daughter for her father to pay significantly reduced child
support payments because the custodial parent is not earning any income. The cases cited
by Mr. Diener do not come close to addressing this circumstance. For instance, in Little
v. Little, 975 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1999) the father left the Air Force and enrolled in law school
"rather than seek employment." 975 P.2d, at 110. There was no discussion of the
mother's income. However, the Arizona court did endorse the Vermont Supreme
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Court's observation that the "responsibilities of begetting a family many times raises
havoc with dreams. Nevertheless, the duty [to support one's children] persists, with full
authority in the State to enforce it." 975 P.2d at 114 (quoting Romano v. Romano, 340
A.2d 63, 64 (Vt. 1975)). Any judicial embrace of Mr. Diener's positions would turn
equity on its head and punish children whose parents agreed to a higher amount of
support and can earn the same income, or more, that they did at the time of the divorce.
Mr. Diener's argument that this Court "should determine that an obligor's decision
to return to school might ultimately benefit the child" (Appellant's Brief, p. 35-6)
(emphasis added) is interesting.

However, it is only argumentative speculation—

completely unsupported by any evidence—that misses the point. Mr. Diener has not
established that his enrollment in school comes at the expense of his ability to earn the
same income he earned at the time of the divorce. Instead, he proved during this case that
he can earn the same amount, or more, while a full-time student. While Zoe might benefit
in the future from Mr. Diener's return to school, she should continue to benefit now
from his present ability to earn at least as much as he did at the time of the decree.
Finally, this Court "may affirm the judgment on any ground, even one not relied
upon by the trial court."

White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994).

"However, any rationale for affirming a decision must find support in the record." Hill
v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). Mr. Diener admitted he did not
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tell Tiffany he was earning $55,000 a year nor offer to pay more support during that
period of time [R. 220, p. 39]. Therefore, he does not qualify to seek equity by claiming
it should now be reduced.
It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equity that it will
grant relief only when fairness and good conscience so
demand. Correlated to this is the precept that equity does not
reward one who has engaged in fraud or deceit in the business
under consideration, but reserves its rewards for those who
are themselves acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is
sometimes said, to those who have come into court with clean
hands.
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1977). The trial court's decision not to
modify child support can be separately affirmed by application of the doctrine of clean
hands.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court properly found that Tiffany would be denied the benefit of her
bargain, having given up alimony and property settlement claims, if § 78-7.2(8) were
interpreted in such a way as to allow Mr. Diener to avoid the obligations of his
agreement. Contrary to his argument that "pursuant to the Court's ruling, Mr. Diener
can never adjust that amount" (Appellant's Brief, p. 37), Utah case law indeed allows for
bargained-for agreements to be modified upon a showing of substantial change in
circumstances. While neither party is prevented from trying to prove a substantial change
in the future to either decrease or increase child support, Mr. Diener has been unable to
18

make that showing now, nor does he qualify to do so. Therefore, Tiffany requests this
Court affirm the district courts Order and award Tiffany her fees and costs incurred
herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c^Y day Qf October, 2003.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C.

JOHN W. CALL
corney for Petitioner/Appellee
*iffany Jacobs Diener
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
this BRIEF OF APPELLEE J ^ / d a y of October, 2003, by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Brian M. Barnard
Utah Legal Clinic
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant Erich Ross Diener
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
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APPENDIX "A"
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
AND ATTACHMENTS [R. 17 - 20]

IN THE

DISTRICT COURT

THIRD

ttlEOGlSTBlCifcoUKT
Third Judicial D<«trirt

COUNTY, STATE OF UTJHAR 2 7 1998

SAT.T T.AKE

Ss&jukj

H ^^twov/ivn y

-ey:

TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)'

VS.

C i v i l N o . 984901948DA

ERIC ROSS DIENER

MOTHER

FATHER

COMBINED

1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this /////////// ///////////
[mother and father for whom support is to be awarded.

mini mi imiiiiiir

1

S 1,700.00

//minnil
n nn n n i\
II in m m\
/inn mill
iiniimi |

2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not
enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1 ) .

-

mm in n\

-

-

mn in ml

S

%

2,892.00

/////////// /////////// $
/////////// ///////////
///////////
IIIIIIiiIII

380.00

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of
1 income.

5

|2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually
|paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case) .

-

2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the
1Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent.

1,192.00

|3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is theS 1,192.00
[I Ad justed Gross Income for child support purposes.
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number
of children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the
JBase Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line
|| 3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain
|each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation.

41
s

$

7 . BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD:
B r i n g down t h e a m o u n t i n L i n e 6
f o r t h e O b l i g o r P a r e n t o r e n t e r t h e a m o u n t f r o m t h e Low I n c o m e
Table.

1,700.00

%

224.00

I///////////I
///////////I

///////////i

224.00

3.

Which parent is the obligor?

9.

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line 7? ( )Yes JOQ No
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ 400.00
t and answer number 10.

10.

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
(X) other: Agreement of the parties

Attorney Bar No. 4571
10/94

( ) Mother

iniiinn

59

%

156.00

iinimml

(x ) Father

( ) Electronic filing

( ) Manual filing

n

FiLE&0|SlKi£|(;bUf{i
Third Judicial

MAR 2 7 1998
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA

TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER

r )

.

STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

Plaintiff
vs.
ERIC ROSS DIENER

Civil no:

984901948PA

Defendant
The Undersigned certifies that the following are submitted in compliance with
U.C.A. 78-45-7.3:
(1)
(2)

Child Support Worksheet
Year-tp-date
Income
rear-jp-date lnco
—^
Plaintiff
^
Defendant
AND
Tax Return
Plaintiff
Defendant

filed
filed

submitted & withdrawn
submitted & withdrawn

OR (FOR DEFAULT ONLY)
Verified statement of defaulting party's income previously served on
that party, if above verification is not available.
(3)

The child support amount requested
is consistent
_.X
is not consistent
with the guidelines.
DATED this

day of

March

J^ytfCBfaAsnJ^h&y^
Signature

/r\

'/.

tfitiB
, 19_98.

DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE MILITARY LEAVE AND EARNINGS
|D | NA.K.E M 5 T . F,RST, yi I
?
• Q1ENER

PRTT.

SOC. SEC. NO.

POSS

554792771

1

IYK3 SwC

IAL

'

P4

AMOUNT
j
TYPE
_ _C . _ . . ' B T T Y
13 7 9 . 1 6 ! F ' l C A - 5_D
2 0 6 , 0 4 FICA-MEDlCARE
S G L I FQH 2 0 0 , 0 0 0
AFRK
DFNTAL

E7S

BRANCH

P3P?P1.

STATEMENT

ACSV'OSSM

,- ARMY

"SR10D COVERED
1"2fl

ALLOTMENTS

DEDUCTIONS

ENTfTLEMSNTS
TYPE
6 A S E PAY
BAS

PAY 2AT£

Ffft ES

SUMMARY

+ *WT C W C
AMOUNT
TYPE
AMOUNT
e s . S o "COMB F E D C A M P T I G N
2 0 . 001 -TOT felSt
20.00
t7.60
50
19.OS
-TDT ALMT

^JtSL
1 .S37..1.&.
M2.09
20.00

-\E7 AMT
1.43J5.0S

-CR f<*0

JUL

1.425.05
1 5 8 7 . 14

TQTAL
LEAVE
FICA
TAXES
PAY
DATA

1 3 , 7 9 . 10
©AC TYPfi

BANK
AOCT

FED
TAXES

*A£E afeHlOD

WAGE YTE

M/sifVj'^oo';. " * * j T A * rTD

:V7

34*7 .AL.13 7 £ . VO
5f j WAGE PERIOD
WAG* YT2
AX VTD
.VSD TAX
STATE
ex
TAXES
3437,0?
• 4 S , 4-JL
^
>J2&.
JL2.
-UUP4
i
,
-1H7.Q7I
ZJl^ClS.
,PP
RENT AMI Si-lAftE i •TAT
! CHARITY YTD|TPC
BAQ DEPN *VHA 2 l f
GAS TYPE
jciq
DCPNS I
PACtON
XL

REMARKS:

20. 00

14 2 . & S

CTS 6Ali':.V i OS! l.V "AID
I
* 1 - 5 J17«?.g!
11 .gl
WAGc PfcRiOD SOC WAfE rTD SCC TAX V7DWlEO WAGc VTii
B= &AI £RND J JSEP

YTD

TOWER FED CR
H 194932

DPAS Form 7 0 2 , May

ENTITLE
UN

92

4P94,7S,

J.

Y T D DEDUCT

0

*

53P.7P

REGULAR

*

40 00

i?420fr.m.
36

0

0305574

NO.090

03/27/98

001

SFD 8153 8015710052 * 8015321913

12:25

It2
I3"
4 1
'

"sj

fi
L7
pr
i

H_ I
D |
E I
F
I
6
B
C
Withhold Tiffany Base Salary«$595 83/paycheck
Soc. Seal Medicare! Fed. Inc.Statelnc Pfotal WilGross PayjNet Pay
|
1/15/98
1847
237 12]
432
10 00 6079
297 91
28.00
1/31/96
3694
8.64
7200
44725
59583
31.00 14B58
3694
2/15/96
8.64
447.25
595 83
72.00
3100 148.58
2/26/98
36 94
864
447.25
7Z00
59583
31.00 148 58
3694
864
31.00 148 58
59583
447.25
3/15/98
7200
3*31*98
000
000
0.00
000
000
000

A
Date

MO QTO
Mil YTD

1G6.24
i 166 24,

3668
38 88

316.00
31600

134 00
134.00

65511
65511

2681.23
268123
• >!••

202612
2026.121

i —i—*0*mt

[Man \\i

\\( QYf\',

i-ffcmy

\wi\r

